Since its inception in Jones v Tsige, legal practitioners have struggled with the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. The limited damages awarded in that case, and what the court indicated would be reasonable for privacy breaches, suggested that the tort would have limited utility as a stand-alone cause of action, and may only arise in in conjunction with other claims. However, the tort has recently been used successfully, at least at the summary judgment level, particularly in the class actions context where the aggregate claims make it more feasible to rely on the tort exclusively. In the wake of The Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in Hopkins v Kay, this paper examines intrusion upon seclusion in the context of privacy breaches in the healthcare sector. This work purports to show that although a statutory regime exists to govern healthcare privacy breaches in Ontario and other provinces in Canada, intrusion upon seclusion is the best method for addressing privacy breaches in this context.
INTRODUCTION
In 2012 the Ontario Court of Appeal created the tort of intrusion upon seclusion in Jones v Tsige. 1 In that case, the defendant bank employee accessed the plaintiff's private financial information 174 times. 2 Adopting the American definition, the court defined the tort of intrusion upon seclusion as follows:
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the invasion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
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In other words, the tort is aimed at defendants who intentionally violate the privacy of a plaintiff in a highly offensive way. The court reviewed the existing legislative regime and concluded that the remedies available to the plaintiff were insufficient: a common law privacy remedy was needed. The Ontario Court of Appeal indicated that damages for breaches of intrusion upon seclusion would be modest, raising concern about the tort's practical significance in litigation. 4 However, the use of this tort in class actions 5 has largely put this concern to rest. 6 Since class actions allow for the aggregation of cases and the accumulation of sizable awards, it may increase the financial feasibility of intrusion upon seclusion litigation. . 2 Ibid at para 2. 3 Ibid at para 19. 4 Glenn Kauth, "Legal aid employee to pay $7,500 for intrusion upon seclusion", Canadian Lawyer Magazine (10 November 2014), online: <http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/legalfeeds/2373/legalaid-employee-to-pay-7-500-for-intrusion-upon-seclusion.html>. 5 This paper uses the terms class actions and class proceedings interchangeably. 6 Arshy Mann, "Focus: Privacy class actions on the rise", Law Times (1 September 2014), online: <http://lawtimesnews.com/201409014155/focus-on/privacy-class-actions-on-the-rise>. 7 2014 FC 250.
Condon v Canada
demonstrating a common issue, despite differences in the circumstances of each breach, for a class of Canadians who allegedly had their privacy breached when an external hard drive of the Federal Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development was lost. While the first of these cases mainly dealt with the disclosure of confidential financial information for fraudulent and improper purposes, 8 the tort has evolved since Jones, and has been used as a claim in various other contexts. 9 Notably, in Hopkins v Kay, 10 the Ontario Court of Appeal held that an intrusion upon seclusion claim could be brought by the plaintiff despite the existence of a statutory regime governing privacy breaches in the health sector. In expanding the common law remedy to the health care sector, Hopkins highlighted several issues including: (1) the potential increased liability faced by health institutions for privacy breaches; (2) the possible strengthening of individual privacy rights in the health care sector given new initiatives to minimize this potential liability; and (3) the usurping by the courts of statutory enforcement mechanisms, which have proved ineffective in preventing privacy breaches. These observations indicate that intrusion upon seclusion claims may play a central role in enhancing patient privacy in the future. This paper will examine the practical purposes of class action litigation paying particular attention to how class actions may be used with intrusion upon seclusion claims. Further, the paper will review how Jones has been used in subsequent cases. I will argue that class action intrusion upon seclusion claims, despite the existence of statutory mechanisms, may be the most viable means to foster individual privacy rights in the health care sector. Part One will provide a brief background of class actions in Canada and explore this unique procedure's relationship with intrusion upon seclusion generally. Part Two will focus specifically on health information class action intrusions. The class actions procedure will be compared with other mechanisms, such as the current Ontario legislative framework, for fostering greater individual privacy protections in Canada. The article will conclude with a discussion of alternatives to vicarious liability for intrusion upon seclusion claims, including regulatory colleges and vicarious liability. I will argue that these methods alone are insufficient for fostering a robust privacy regime. Indeed, given the other mechanisms available, tort law may be the best incentive for advancing protections and controls of sensitive patient information in the health sector rather than being overkill in liability. Where the privacy breach by a potential defendant is borne by many plaintiffs, class proceedings are the preferable means to advance intrusion upon seclusion claims. Importantly, limited damages are available for such breaches with individual claimants: damages for intrusion upon seclusion are capped at $20,000.
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The size of these awards would normally place individual plaintiffs in the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction in Ontario. 27 However, given the extensive rules for discovery and productions available to trial courts class proceedings arguably allow for a more rigorous examination of the evidence and a more thorough investigation of the claims being made. Moreover, the threat of intrusion upon seclusion class actions should encourage potential defendants to take measures to prevent these breaches. The heightened sensitivity to privacy breaches and importance of individual privacy in today's society 28 enables this threat of liability to incentivize institutions to develop proactive measures to prevent these breaches. In turn, this may encourage broader societal change towards stronger privacy protections, which is necessary given the outdated privacy law regime.
29

B. Intrusion Upon Seclusion In Its Infancy
Use Of The Tort
Early intrusion upon seclusion cases frequently used the tort to supplement other claims 30 because the corresponding modest damages did not justify using the tort alone in litigation commenced by individuals. To date, Jones has been referenced in nearly fifty cases but only a small number of decisions make a finding on the tort. Many of these reported decisions have stalled on interlocutory judgment, summary judgment motions, or on a certification motion for class proceedings. 31 Likely, in certification motions for class actions, a similar stall will emerge in the form of not disclosing a reasonable cause of action. However, the reasonable cause of action test is a low threshold. such, the full scope of intrusion upon seclusion claims, and its impact on tort law generally, has yet to be determined.
Where an intrusion claim has been advanced as the sole head of damages, the damages have been modest. In McIntosh v Legal Aid Ontario, 33 the plaintiff was awarded damages for a privacy breach against the defendant who worked at Legal Aid Ontario. The defendant accessed the Children's Aid information of the plaintiff, the defendant's current boyfriend's ex-girlfriend. The boyfriend disclosed this breach to the ex-girlfriend, who threatened to use this information to take away the plaintiff's children. As a result, the plaintiff claimed she suffered "substantial anxiety, emotion [sic] upset, depression, significant stress, embarrassment, weight loss, insomnia, isolation, and an inability to concentrate at work." 34 While the judge found that the elements of the tort were met, he only awarded the plaintiff $10,000 in damages. Given the arguably serious nature of the breach, it is not clear whether the court would have awarded more damages if the cap was not set so low.
In some stand-alone intrusion upon seclusion claims, courts have rejected or limited the applicability of the tort, thereby demonstrating the potential limits of the use of this claim for a breach of privacy.
For example, in Complex Services Inc v Ontario Public Service Employees Union Local 278,
35 the arbitrator dismissed an intrusion upon seclusion claim in the context of a disclosure of medical information.
The arbitrator determined that Jones should not be interpreted as establishing an absolute right to privacy for employees and that case did not alter the right of the employer to manage the workplace in a reasonable manner. 36 In Ludmer v Ludmer, 37 the applicant pleaded intrusion upon seclusion based on allegations of intercepted email and fax communication in a matrimonial proceeding. The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's decision that there was no evidence of the email interception, and that the act of putting documents in a fax machine to the applicant's lawyer was not in itself sufficient for an invasion of privacy claim. 42 In this case, twenty-six government employees brought a labour grievance based on access of their private information during a series of unjustified credit checks by a peace officer. The arbitrator distinguished the case from Jones because the activity in Jones emerged in a commercial, rather than an employment, relationship. 43 The arbitrator also found "the conduct and the harm in this case to be considerably less egregious and damaging" than in Jones. 44 While the intrusion claim failed, this case suggests that sensitivities surrounding private information, and the nature of the privacy breach, will play a significant role in how courts apply the tort. In a health care context, it is likely that inappropriate access or disclosure of this information will meet this threshold.
II. CLASS ACTION INTRUSIONS
A. Class Actions for Health Records
Summary of Hopkins
In 2015, the Ontario Court of Appeal released Hopkins, a landmark decision that is perhaps the most unanticipated use of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion to date. Specifically, Hopkins demonstrated that the tort could be applied not only to the financial sector, as was the case in Jones, but also to the health care industry. 45 Like financial institutions, health care organizations collect, store, and use large quantities of private information on a daily basis. Intrusion upon seclusion is particularly relevant in the health care context because of the potential distress and humiliation that individuals may experience if health records are disclosed to the public or to third parties. Historically, Ontario has addressed medical privacy breaches through the Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA). 46 While PHIPA was intended to be comprehensive by covering all aspects of medical data, 47 41 Ibid at para 55. 42 [2012] AGAA No 23. 43 Ibid at para 20. 44 Ibid at para 33. 45 Hopkins CA, supra note 10 at para 73 
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In both of these cases, the courts found that the statutory schemes in their respective jurisdictions prohibited the use of intrusion upon seclusion as a common law mechanism of privacy enforcement. 53 The defendant in Hopkins thus claimed that PHIPA was similarly structured in Ontario.
Under PHIPA, the mechanism for enforcement in cases of a suspected breach is a complaint to the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC), 54 who has discretion to investigate complaints 55 and commence investigations independently. 56 The IPC's powers of investigation are broad, including the power to inspect and to produce records without a warrant. 57 The IPC also requires a health information custodian to change their practices for the use, collection, or disclosure of personal health information. 58 Given this arguably expansive statute, the defendant took the position in Hopkins that recognizing a common law cause of action for private health information would usurp the role of the legislature, which intended PHIPA to comprehensively govern this area. 59 The trial judge rejected this argument, noting significant differences in the remedies provided by the tort and PHIPA, as well as differences in limitations. 60 In obiter dicta, the trial judge stated that the explicit reference to PHIPA in Jones indicated that both the trial judge and the Ontario Court of Appeal were fully aware of the existing statutory regimes in this area. 61 He further noted that both courts in Jones conducted an extensive review and were aware of the rulings in other jurisdictions when they chose not to adopt the same reasoning. 62 Ultimately, the judge concluded that intrusion upon seclusion did in fact apply to claims otherwise covered by PHIPA.
48 Hopkins CA, supra note 10 at para 3. 49 Ibid at para 11. 55 Ibid s 57(1-4). 56 Ibid ss 58 and 60. 57 Ibid s 60. 58 Hopkins ONSC, supra note 52 at paras 10-11. 59 Ibid at para 19. 60 Ibid at para 14. 61 Ibid at para 27. 62 Ibid at para 30.
Implications and Scope of Hopkins
While the applicability of intrusion upon seclusion in the health context was not a guarantee, in rendering its judgment in Jones, the Ontario Court of Appeal explicitly included health information as the type of issue that would attract an interest in privacy:
As the facts of this case indicate, routinely kept electronic databases render our most personal financial information vulnerable. Sensitive information as to our health is similarly available, as are records of the books we have borrowed or bought, the movies we have rented or downloaded, where we have shopped, where we have travelled and the nature of our communications by cellphone, email or text message.
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Therefore, following Hopkins, the broader applicability of intrusion upon seclusion in the health care sector will have a significant impact on the regulation of privacy breaches.
As He stated that it was too early to dismiss the possibility that the family members of Mr. Sinclair had sufficient proximity in tort to make a claim as the result of a privacy breach of a family member. 67 Justice Monnin stated that the genetic nature of many medical conditions, and the sensitive nature of inheritable traits and diseases, may in fact open up intrusion upon seclusion claims to a much larger plaintiff base and even to a broader class than what was observed in Hopkins.
B. Use of PHIPA for Protecting Privacy
As stated in Hopkins, since privacy legislation is comprehensive, bringing an intrusion upon seclusion claim may be redundant when trying to address an alleged privacy breach. Under PHIPA, for example, an individual may be guilty of an offence and liable for a fine of up to $50,000 if he or she intentionally collects, uses, or discloses personal health information, while organizations may be liable to a fine of up to $250,000. 69 However, this section of PHIPA is misleading. Although these penalties do exist under PHIPA, the statute has not been effectively applied in this manner. For example, there has been only one prosecution for an offence under PHIPA to date, and it did not result in a conviction. 70 In under PHIPA. While this suggested some promise for the enforcement mechanisms of the statute, the charges were ultimately dropped due to a sixteen-month delay and no fines were imposed on the nurse. 73 Arguably, PHIPA has been ineffective in addressing privacy breaches by health information custodians and in providing a proper deterrence mechanism for privacy breaches of health records. These deficiencies were highlighted by the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC), who stated the following:
The fact that charges may be laid will be an effective deterrent only to the extent that custodians and their agents believe that such measures are going to be used in appropriate circumstances. Given the current pervasiveness of the problem of unauthorized access, it may be necessary to increase the number of prosecutions to warn custodians and their agents that unauthorized access is not acceptable and will not be tolerated. 74 Despite the Ontario IPC receiving over 400 complaints of privacy breaches a year, the IPC has been unable to effectively investigate and prosecute breaches, as evidenced by the lack of prosecutions. 75 It is perhaps not surprising that Ontario has been less successful in prosecuting the unauthorized access of personal health information than other jurisdictions in Canada. 76 This may be the result of statutory regimes or ineffective regulatory enforcement mechanisms. However, as seen in the above cases, Canadian prosecutions have generally tended to focus on the health information custodian and not on the organization itself. This creates little incentive or motivation for health institutions to place proper checks and balances on their employees in order to deter privacy breaches within their organizations. The types of damages awarded under PHIPA also differ from intrusion upon seclusion, as noted in Hopkins. For example, if an individual or an organization is convicted under PHIPA, potential plaintiffs affected by an order or the conduct leading to the conviction may initiate court proceedings for damages for any actual harm suffered: PHIPA specifically permits courts to award up to $10,000 for mental anguish in cases where a defendant's wilful or reckless conduct causes actual harm to a plaintiff. 77 However, proof of harm is not a required element for intrusion upon seclusion, which is particularly important given the nature of privacy breaches.
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While privacy breaches are themselves harmful, it is very difficult to demonstrate actual harm unless the information is used inappropriately, as was the case in Evans v The Bank of Nova Scotia.
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The high threshold for obtaining damages under PHIPA suggests that it will be even less likely to secure a successful conviction. This threshold also shifts the focus away from preventing the actual breach and, instead, prioritizes harm prevention with respect to the use of the inappropriately collected information, which is ineffective as a practical deterrent. In contrast, the modest damages threshold established in Jones would be appropriately increased under the intrusion upon seclusion framework if actual harm is established.
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A further advantage to intrusion upon seclusion claims when compared to PHIPA regulation is that, rather than strengthening privacy rights through taxpayer funding or extended investigation periods for the IPC, the common law mechanism would effectively shift the costs of privacy enforcement from the public sector to private parties. While courts are strained for resources, the judicial economy of class actions makes the large number of these breaches a more effective means to address them, rather than on a case-by-case basis. . 76 IPCO Report, supra note 71 at 9-10. 77 PHIPA, supra note 48 at s 65(3). 78 Jones, supra note 1 at para 74. 79 2014 ONSC 2135 at para 52. 80 Jones, supra note 1 at para 83.
C. Other Methods of Privacy Disincentives and Enforcement
Professional Discipline as a Disincentive to Breach
Another enforcement mechanism against the unauthorized access of health information is direct disciplinary action against the health information custodian. For example, the Professional Standards for the College of Nurses of Ontario states that "[n]urses are responsible for their actions and the consequences of those actions," 81 and are "accountable for conducting themselves in ways that promote respect for the profession." 82 While the college disciplines its members for accessing health information without authorization, this method is ultimately ineffective in preventing privacy breaches. For example, the college suspended a nurse for three months for accessing the personal health information of 338 hospital patients without authorization. 83 Although the employer terminated the nurse, the official term was changed to a resignation for the purposes of her employment record. Consequently, following a three-month suspension, the nurse had no record of professional misconduct. 84 A similar penalty was used in College of Nurses of Ontario v Smith, 85 despite the nurse having already been disciplined for accessing and disclosing a patient's medical record multiple times without consent. The Discipline Committee of the college explained the rationale behind the nurse's punishment as follows:
[T]he three-month suspension is a clear message to the Member and the membership that clients' health information must be protected. Because of the ease of access to electronic health records, there is greater onus on the membership to access information only when appropriate and for professional use. The public has every right to expect that nurses will safeguard their health information. 86 Sanction by the College of Nurses of Ontario is often even less condemning than the above two cases. For example, in College of Nurses of Ontario v Hooker, 87 a nurse accessed electronic records of two physicians, who were also patients, at a mental health facility that had recently transitioned to electronic records. The nurse accessed this information solely because she knew both of the physicians and was curious. Despite being warned that any subsequent misconduct could result in termination of her employment, less than six months later she accessed the files of several other patients for whom she was never clinically responsible. 88 Upon termination, the college determined that based on the nurse's acceptance of responsibility and the fact that this was her first instance of discipline, a suspension of thirty days and a fine of $3,500 was both reasonable and in the public interest.
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While some professional bodies have elected to uphold the termination of employees who accessed patients' health information without authorization, this situation is not common. For example, in Timmins & District Hospital v Ontario Nurses' Assn (Peever Grievance), 90 an employee accessed a former spouse and mother of the spouse's grandchild's health information with whom the nurse had no clinical relationships. In this case, the dismissal was upheld despite the nurse's twenty-two years of service and no previous disciplinary infractions. The Discipline Committee held that the violation of the patient's trust, the disregard for employer policies and professional ethics, and the PHIPA breach all meant that the discipline was not excessive. 91 Similarly, in North Bay, 92 a nurse inappropriately accessed personal health information from 5,800 patients on more than 12,000 occasions over seven years. While the nurse claimed she had right to access this information for educational purposes, based on section 37(1)(d) of PHIPA, the arbitrator rejected this claim. 93 Evidently, the current statutory regime and the professional regulations have been ineffective in preventing and in disciplining privacy breaches.
Vicarious Liability and the Health Care Institution
A health care institution may also take disciplinary action against its employees in order to avoid becoming vicariously liable for their actions. In Bazley v Curry, 94 the Supreme Court of Canada declared that the extent of power that employers have over their employees is a significant factor when determining whether an organization should be held vicariously liable for torts committed by its employees. The court noted that the vulnerability of victims to the wrongful exercise of employer power-in this case, the collection or disclosure of private health data-would further indicate that the organization should be held vicariously liable While regulatory colleges may be inclined to protect the identities of the nurses it oversees, the publicity of a court case may not lead to the same concern for the defendant's privacy. As a result intrusion upon seclusion class actions may ultimately result in widespread identification of the employees involved in a particular breach, which may provide the incentive needed for organizations as well as individual custodians to adhere to PHIPA and other policies.
Outside Regulated Professions
Professional regulation is also insufficient to prevent privacy breaches given that health-related breaches occur outside of the self-regulated professions. For example, the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal reviewed a summary hearing in Fallico v St Joseph's Health Centre, 96 where a chaplain in a Roman Catholic community teaching hospital disclosed information about a patient's desire to end his life. The chaplain was ultimately terminated for this disclosure. The patient had also expressed this desire to individuals outside his circle of care. While both parties conceded that the hospital was a health information custodian under PHIPA and that the chaplain was an agent of the hospital, 97 the disagreement was about whether PHIPA or the hospital's policies prohibited this disclosure, since the information had already been provided to third parties. The adjudicator found that there was nothing under either the regulatory or the statutory regime that prevented the chaplain from disclosing this information, and he was therefore able to follow his religious beliefs. 98 Nevertheless, the adjudicator held that the termination of applicant was based on his violation of company policies, not his religion, and violating company policies is not a protected ground under the Code. 99 Although the chaplain's application was unsuccessful, the ruling demonstrates the limited recourse available to health institutions to enforce privacy policies, which is often limited to termination of employment. Health care settings often involve several different types of employees, including many who are 95 Ibid. 96 2013 HRTO 1192 (CanLII). 97 Ibid at para 12. 98 Ibid at para 21. 99 Ibid.
not subject to discipline by a regulatory college. Therefore, as a privacy enforcement mechanism, regulatory discipline alone is unlikely to be effective.
CONCLUSION
While PHIPA was intended to be a comprehensive and thorough regulatory regime to address privacy interests in the health sector, there is a noticeable regulatory gap in the way this act functions. The threat of prosecution under PHIPA has not adequately deterred health information custodians, or others who may have access to medical records, from committing privacy breaches. To address this issue and update the legislation for modern technology, Ontario Health Minister Dr. Eric Hoskins introduced new measures on June 10, 2015 that aim to protect patient privacy and strengthen accountability in the health care system. The new amendments are expected to increase fines and make the prosecution of PHIPA offences less cumbersome. 100 However, even if the amendments are passed, it is uncertain whether they will provide a sufficient deterrent to individuals and organizations involved in privacy breaches. After two decades of class proceedings legislation in Ontario, class actions are under review by the Law Commission of Ontario. The review is being conducted because of criticism of the settlement funds received per class member after legal fees and the ample costs imposed in unsuccessful actions. 101 Nonetheless, there appears to be even greater shortcomings in other deterrent mechanisms, such as PHIPA and the discipline of professional colleges. For example, several hospital workers were charged under PHIPA for accessing the medical records of Rob Ford, the former mayor of Toronto, without authorization during his 2015 cancer treatments. 102 However, this was only the second instance of the IPC reporting offenders of PHIPA to the Ministry of the Attorney General for prosecution. Evidently, for the health sector in particular, the risk of widespread liability in class action litigation is more likely to motivate health institutions to strengthen their privacy protections and impose harsher disciplinary measures than the current statutory regime.
Neither PHIPA nor regulatory bodies have been successfully employed in a consistent manner for privacy breaches and they have not been useful in directly imposing financial penalties on the parties involved. In contrast, class actions are effective in deterring conduct in potential defendants and have the ability to encourage change. Society may eventually be forced to choose between two alternatives: either invest and strengthen the statutory regime or provide more resources to assist in processing class action cases.
Currently, there are enhancements being made to the statutory regime. 103 For example, the sharing of electronic health records (EHRs), results in all participants becoming custodians of the shared and collected information. 104 As a result, the IPC has urged providers that share EHRs to establish a governance framework that would clearly show providers how to comply with PHIPA and create preventive measures that reduce privacy breaches. 105 Nevertheless, as with other IPC mechanisms, there is little enforcement or likelihood of prosecution to ensure compliance with these guidelines. These changes could improve the statutory regime by making reporting to the IPC mandatory and by doubling the fines where an investigation is pursued. 106 However, the lack of successful prosecutions in the past decade of PHIPA illustrates that these changes alone are unlikely to foster improved privacy protections. Class actions thus remain the preferable option for privacy enforcement. As noted by Chief Justice McLachlin in Hollick, "judicial economy, access to justice, and behaviour modification" are distinct advantages of class actions. 107 Intrusion upon seclusion and its use in class proceedings is still new in Ontario, so the influence of these legal developments has yet to be fully realized. The tort was created in Ontario because of inaction by the legislature in properly addressing privacy breaches and because of the corresponding rise of public concern over privacy interests. Therefore, the ineffectiveness of the IPC, or the inability of the statutory regime to properly protect privacy rights in the health sector, may also give rise to a greater use of the court system to enforce these interests. Given the pressure that Ontario courts are already under, this may not be an ideal shift. However, it may be one that becomes necessary until alternative enforcement mechanisms or adequate deterrents are in place to protect the privacy interests of Canadians, especially within the health sector.
